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How do we acquire moral obligations to others? The most straightforward cases are those where 
we acquire obligations as the result of particular actions which we voluntarily perform. If I 
promise you that I will trim your hedge, I face a moral obligation to uphold my promise, and in 
the absence of some morally significant countervailing reason, I should indeed cut your hedge. 
Moral obligations which arise as a result of wrongdoing, as a function of corrective justice, are 
typically thought to be of a similar nature. If I set fire to your hedge, I owe you compensation: 
both for the damage caused to your property and for any directly related losses you may have 
suffered as a consequence of my actions. It is more controversial, although not uncommon, to 
suggest that agents can acquire moral obligations as a result of the actions of others. Cases of 
rescue are an obvious example: if another individual is pushed into a pond and is about to drown, 
and I (and only I) can rescue her at no risk and little cost to myself, many would maintain that I 
face an obligation to save her. This obligation may impose costs upon me (which may be 
unrecoverable), but it mandates me regardless of the fact that I have done nothing to bring this 
obligation upon myself, other than happening (blamelessly) to be in a particular place at a 
particular time. The case of how an agent may be said to acquire moral obligations involuntarily 
is particularly important in philosophical consideration of present day obligations arising from 
historic injustice. One commonly expressed claim has it that agents can acquire rectificatory 
obligations as a result of benefiting from acts of injustice committed by others, such as their 
ancestors. Judith Jarvis Thomson makes the case in the context of the debate over positive 
discrimination, maintaining that it is not inappropriate to impose costs upon young white males, 
even though “…no doubt few, if any, have, themselves, individually, done any wrongs to blacks 
 2 
and women”, since “they have profited from the wrongs the community did.”
1
 More generally, 
claims that various Western nations owe compensation to their former colonies as a consequence 
of the (disputed) fact that they are benefiting from colonialism and/or from slavery in the present 
day are commonplace. 
 
This article examines, and defends, the claim that agents can acquire rectificatory obligations 
through involuntarily benefiting from acts of injustice.
 2
 I start, in Part One, by considering David 
Miller’s article ‘Distributing Responsibilities’ 3 which focuses on the distribution of duties of 
assistance, in cases where it is accepted that someone ought to provide assistance to those in need 
but where it is controversial upon whom the costs of assistance should fall. Miller proposes four 
morally relevant forms of connection with the victims of injustice which can give rise to moral 
obligations to assist – I propose that benefiting from the plight of those in desperate need, 
however involuntarily, constitutes an additional morally relevant form of connection. Part Two 
goes further, and argues that moral agents can possess compensatory obligations as a result of 
involuntarily benefiting from injustice even when the victims of injustice do not need to be lifted 
above some minimal threshold level of well-being. 
 
Part One - Miller on duties of assistance 
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In ‘Distributing Responsibilities’, David Miller seeks to address what he calls “the problem of 
remedial responsibility”, which he defines as follows: 
 
To be remedially responsible for a bad situation means to have a special obligation to put the bad situation 
right, in other words to be picked out, either individually or along with others, as having a responsibility 
towards the deprived or suffering party that is not shared equally among all agents.
4 
 
The kinds of “bad situation” Miller has in mind are those where individuals or groups are below 
some minimal threshold of well-being, such as Iraqi children who are malnourished and lack 
access to proper medical care. In such cases, Miller supposes that it is not in question whether the 
situation requires a remedy, given that it is possible that a remedy could be given;
5
 the interesting 
question is who it is that should do the remedying (in the absence of an institutional mechanism 
for formally assigning responsibility.) His aim is to find a principle, or set of principles, for 
assigning this responsibility “which carries moral weight, so that we can say that agents who fail 
to discharge their remedial responsibilities act wrongly and may properly be sanctioned.”
6
 His 
methodology here makes explicit reference to our existing intuitive beliefs as to who it is that 
properly bears these responsibilities: his aim is to “lay out principles for distributing 
responsibilities that we hope will command widespread agreement.”
7
 He considers four different 
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approaches that seemingly find support in the real world: based upon causal or on moral 
responsibility for the occurrence of the condition; on capacity for remedying the condition and on 
communal obligations to the affected party or parties. He concludes that no single approach can 
give a full account of who should remedy the situation in any given situation – using a single 
principle results in intuitively unpalatable outcomes. Instead, he argues for a “connection theory”, 
whereby any of the four relations listed above may establish a sufficiently strong link between 
parties to allocate remedial responsibility. Which principle is to be invoked in a given case will 
depend upon its particular characteristics, so that “when connections have to be weighed against 





 In this section I accept the idea of the connection theory, but argue for a fifth possible ground for 
the acquisition of remedial responsibility, specifically that of receiving benefits from the 
occurrence in question. My claim is that it is possible to think of cases where this form of 
connection seems intuitively to give rise to remedial responsibilities, even though other forms of 
connection, as listed by Miller, are also present. 
 
Consider the following example. Four people, A, B, C and D live on a remote island; each one 
possessing one quarter of the land. All four are entirely self-sufficient, and their landholdings are 
separated by high fences. There is little or no contact between the four. The only crop which will 
grow on the island is the extremely versatile Polychrestos plant, whose root can be used to 
produce a wide variety of different dishes, as well as providing raw materials for clothing and 
other household essentials. The Polychrestos plant’s root grows underground and is harvested 
each autumn, and must not be disturbed at any other part of the year. Although this means that the 
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size of the crop will only be revealed at harvest time, the climate on the island is extremely 
constant, and the island’s underground river distributes water evenly throughout the island’s soil. 
Nonetheless, the Polychrestos plant is a high maintenance crop; and the size of the underground 
portion of the plant therefore is strictly correlated to the amount of care the overground portion of 
the plant receives. In order for each person to support herself, she must produce 200 kilos of root 
per year. A is a very hard-working, industrious type, whose agricultural efforts, from dawn to 
dusk each day, mean that she produces 700 kilos per annum, allowing her to eat very well and 
produce a wide range of leisure products. B, C and D are rather laid-back in their approach to 
agriculture, and work just five hours a day to produce the minimum 200 kilos a year. After a year 
of this, however, D, a rather unsavoury character, decides she does not want to work even five 
hours each day. Unknown to all the others, she diverts the underground river away from B and 
C’s sections of land, so that her land receives all of their water, boosting, she hopes, her own crop 
considerably. When harvest time comes, there are a number of surprises. A harvests her 
regulation 700 kilos. C’s land has had no water, and consequently she has no crop. She is 
destitute, despite her efforts over the past year. It also emerges that D (no water engineer) has in 
fact diverted the water away from her own land as well as that of C, and B, far from having a 
failed crop, has been the beneficiary. To her surprise, she harvests 400 kilos. D is also destitute, 
and in rage and despair hangs herself with a rope fashioned from the last of the previous year’s 
Polychrestos crop. This leaves the problem of C. Without her year’s produce, C will die unless A 
and B provide her with the necessary 200 kilos. How should the remedial responsibilities be 
distributed? There appear to be no ties of community between the individuals, and neither is 
either causally or morally responsible for C’s fate – that responsibility, in both senses, lies with 
D. This seems to leave us only with capacity – who is better placed to remedy C’s situation? 
Either A or B could transfer the necessary 200 kilos to C, while retaining at least 200 kilos 
themselves, but evidently A’s extra level of resources mean that her capacity is the greater. As 
 6 
such, on Miller’s account, A has the greater connection to C and bears the remedial responsibility. 
Yet does not such a conclusion seem intuitively objectionable? Miller notes of the capacity 
approach that, “its exclusive focus on the present necessarily blinds it to historical 
considerations”
9
 – it does not consider how the resources which are to be redistributed came 
about. In this case, D’s actions conferred benefits upon B. Should we not hold that B’s improved 
position, which has come about as a direct result of C’s worsened position, constitutes just the 
sort of “morally relevant relation” between parties which might be considered when we ask who 
should bear remedial responsibilities?  
 
Thus, one could formulate the following claim in relation to remedial responsibilities: 
 
If the events which cause agent C to fall below the morally relevant threshold confer benefits 
upon agent B, then the fact of the receipt of these benefits, however involuntary, establishes a 
morally relevant connection between C and B, which may give rise to remedial obligations on the 
part of B. 
 
It is key that the claim only states that receipt of benefits may give rise to remedial obligations. 
As with Miller’s four other forms of morally relevant connection, in cases where more than one 
party is relevantly connected to the suffering agent we must use our moral intuitions to determine 
either which party bears the primary responsibility, or how the costs should be shared amongst 
different parties. My claim in this section is simply that benefiting from injustice constitutes a 
fifth form of morally relevant connection to go alongside Miller’s existing four, which may give 
rise to remedial responsibilities in certain circumstances. This improves the existing typology in 
two ways. The first is that it responds directly to the problems that Miller cites with the capacity 
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problem, in that it identifies a class of resources which may be available for remedying a situation 
– those which have arisen elsewhere as a result of that situation – which do not have a 
problematic history, in that it is hard to link them to their present owners by any kind of desert 
claim. But furthermore, there are independent moral reasons for supposing that such resources 
should be redistributed. It is not so much that they represent a class of neutral resources which 
can be safely redistributed, as that, insofar as they represent the “fruits of injustice”, they may be 
seen as distortions within the overall scheme of distribution. This can be seen by examining 
Miller’s account of when it is that different relations amongst the four he identifies become 
relevant in determining remedial responsibility. It is not always the case that this allocation of 
responsibility should turn on, for example, the extent to which different parties can effectively 
remedy the situation, and the costs they will bear in doing so. Thus in some cases there are 
“independent moral reasons” for assigning remedial responsibility to a particular agent, and this 
applies most obviously when A is morally responsible for P’s injury, when there may be two such 
reasons. These essentially stem from the concept of corrective justice. The first of these is that: 
 
…first, where A has unjustly benefited from the injury he has inflicted on P – he has stolen something of 
P’s or exploited him, for example – then if A is made to compensate P by returning what he has taken or in 
some way undoing the damage he has inflicted, then this will help to cancel out A’s unjust gain, and so 
restore justice between them. 
10 
 
Secondly, even if A has not benefited from his actions, he has wronged P, and owes P 
compensation. Our concern here is with the first of these reasons. We need not think that the only 
circumstances where a party enjoys an “unjust gain” are those whereby she gains as a result of 
acting unjustly. In a legal context, for example, the category of “unjust enrichment by 
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subtraction” within the law of restitution is principally concerned with those circumstances 
whereby injustice in distribution arises despite the absence of wrongdoing; in the case, for 
example, of a mistaken payment.
11
 It is possible to see the changes in distribution that emerge as a 
result of injustice as (to use Nickel’s term) “distortions” in the overall scheme of distribution, 
even if the party who has benefited has acted legitimately and has not committed any 
wrongdoing. Such cases may be seen as falling squarely within the preserve of corrective justice, 
defined by Nickel as, “the matter of people having those things that they deserve and are entitled 
to, or otherwise ought to have, and compensation serves justice by preventing and undoing 
actions that would prevent people from having those things.”
12
 Such an approach evidently serves 
an Aristotelian conception of justice as the maintenance of an equilibrium of goods between 
members of society.
13
 If corrective justice is seen in this way, then, as Coleman writes, 
“rectification… is a matter of justice when it is necessary to protect a distribution of holdings (or 
entitlements) from distortions which arise from unjust enrichments and wrongful losses. The 
principle of corrective justice requires the annulments of both wrongful gains and losses.”
14
 The 
claim here, then, is that insofar as a third party directly benefits from unjust action and the victim 
suffers, a distortion in the fair scheme of distribution is created. Insofar as pinning remedial 
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obligations on benefiting third parties seeks to correct this distortion, it appears that we have 
independent moral reasons for the allocation of responsibilities. 
 
 
Part Two – Benefiting from injustice and compensation for wrongs 
 
 
It has been argued that the receipt of benefits – however involuntary – stemming from an act of 
injustice can confer remedial obligations upon a moral agent.  The arguments put forward so far, 
however, apply only to a particular kind of remedial responsibility, namely responsibility for 
fulfilling duties of assistance. In such cases, it is a given that assistance should be given by 
someone; the question is who it should be. There is no question of not imposing a burden on 
someone. But such “bad situations” are not the only ones which may be thought to be in potential 
need of remedy. What of “bad situations” where one party is wronged and harmed by another, but 
not so badly harmed as to fall below a minimal level of welfare sufficient to bring duties of 
assistance into play? Might a third party who benefits from the injustice in such cases potentially 
acquire compensatory obligations? In speaking of “victims of injustice” here, I mean to refer to 
people who have been both wronged and harmed by the actions of another agent or agents. The 
“bad situation” here is not defined in terms of some independently derived minimal level of 
welfare, an absolute criterion; rather, it involves the position of the victim of injustice relative to a 
counterfactual position, which may be defined crudely as that where the injured party would have 
been had the unjust action never occurred.
15
 If we assume that the harm suffered is not sufficient 
to bring the victim below our welfare threshold, then why should we believe that anyone not 
responsible for causing the harm should have obligations to remedy it? Doing so seems to run 
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counter to the common law principle of “risk bearing”, which holds that losses should generally 
lie where they fall. 16 Cane defends the principle thus: 
 
The shifting of a loss – or making one person compensate another for some misfortune – involves an 
alteration of the status quo and so it involves administrative expense. Therefore (it is usually asserted), the 
onus is on those who wish to shift a loss to justify the shift. Unless there is some good reason for shifting a 




This position assumes an account of distributive justice which is generally happy to allow 
individuals to suffer losses without requiring that others pay compensation to make up for their 
losses. So the question is whether, within such an account, the fact that an innocent third party has 
benefited from another’s wrongdoing gives us a good reason to shift some or all of the victim’s 
losses to the third party. It is my belief that we lack a coherent set of principles to answer this 
question. For example, having just cited a common law principle, it is interesting to see how 
various different branches of legal theory cope with the problem. Consider, first of all, the case of 
accident liability in tort law, which determines under what circumstances agents should be liable 
to pay compensation to the victims of accidents. There is no real consideration here given to the 
concept of benefit at all. There is certainly debate over when parties who cause an accident 
should pay compensation for the costs of the accident, but this most usually involves a 
disagreement over the moral legitimacy or otherwise of strict tort liability, which holds that 
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compensation is due if one is causally responsible for an accident, even if one is not at fault.
18
 
The alternatives to models which place liability on those responsible for the accident are those 
which place it either on a particular group who are most likely to cause such accidents, under a 
principle of risk-sharing (such as when motorists as a group are held responsible for the costs of 
traffic accidents), or on society as a whole, under a principle of loss-distribution, which broadly 
stems from communitarian obligations.
19
 So no reference is made to the possibility of 
consideration of third party benefits. Mention has already been made of the concept of unjust 
enrichment under the law of restitution, according to which, it is maintained, the law protects one 
person from being unjustly enriched at another’s expense. This seems clearly applicable to the 
present case, and yet the extent to which claims may be made under this general principle are 
(broadly speaking) limited to cases where one party has either freely accepted a particular benefit 
or has possession of or legal title to a particular item of property or sum of money to which 
another party has a strong moral entitlement. For reasons which will be discussed later, moves to 
claim that an agent might acquire obligations through the involuntary receipt of a benefit in kind 
are severely restricted. Finally, in the area of criminal law, a slightly different approach is taken 
to the subject of possessing stolen goods. If I have been given or have bought for a cheap price an 
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item of stolen property in good-faith, I may reasonably be said to have benefited from an act of 
injustice. The question of what should happen next varies for different kinds of property, and in 
different legal jurisdictions. In some cases, the beneficiary has to return the item, receiving no 
compensation even if she has purchased it in good faith. Clearly, this might leave the (one-time) 
beneficiary of an injustice paying the greatest price for the injustice, and being worse off than she 
was prior to the injustice. In other cases it is the victim who is held liable for these costs, and the 




Given the variable legal treatment of the issue, we must look to its theoretical underpinning. The 
most common way that moral agents are said to acquire compensatory obligations is through 
what is sometimes called “the fault principle”. In broad terms, this is the idea that those who are 
responsible for injuring other parties bear a moral responsibility to compensate the victims of 
their actions, precisely because it is their fault that the injuries in question occurred. Once it is 
established what would compensate the injured party, the guilty party has a moral obligation to so 
act, insofar as they are able to do so. Evidently, this is the understanding of moral responsibility 
discussed by Miller in the previous section, and, as before, it seems clear that this should 
generally be the primary response to acts of injustice and is in most cases the ideal response. 
However, what of circumstances where the parties who were actually responsible for the act of 
injustice do not or cannot fulfil their obligations? For some writers this is the end of the matter, 
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and any suggestion of the acquisition of compensatory obligations without fault is simply 
unacceptable. Thus O’Neill writes: 
 
…some laissez faire liberals are dubious about rights to compensation except where the individuals who 
inflicted wrong are identifiable and obliged to compensate for the injuries they inflicted. On such views 
rights to compensation are symmetrical with rights to punish, in that they are absent when there is no 




As it stands, such a position is too strong, as it rules out the possibility that non-offenders may 
acquire compensatory obligations through prior agreements that one party will cover another’s 
losses in the event of them suffering particular harms. This may be either as a result of a 
contractual arrangement, as in the case of buying insurance, or simply as a result of a promise or 
commitment, such as when a government sets up an agency to compensate victims of crime for 
their injuries. Such schemes are not normally seen as justifiable if they actually allow the offender 
to escape responsibility, but rather act as a safety net to compensate victims should they not 
receive their due from the offender. Thus, for example, car insurance should not protect one from 
a conviction for dangerous driving, nor from subsequent claims for damages, but covers one for 
accidental harm one causes and for any harms one may suffer through accident or the fault of 
others. This is simply a case of a special obligation, of the same nature as a promise. As such, the 
obligation is essentially voluntaristic. 
 
The issue becomes controversial, then, when it is claimed compensatory obligations can be 
acquired involuntarily. As noted above, the question of the involuntary receipt of benefits has 
                                                           
21
 Onora O’Neill, ‘Rights to Compensation’, Social Philosophy and Policy 5 (1987), 72-87 at p. 77. 
 14 
been explicitly invoked in the context of discussions of the normative justifications of reverse 
discrimination as a compensatory response to injustice. A frequently cited example comes from 
the writing of Judith Jarvis Thomson. She concedes that practices of reverse discrimination in 
hiring impose costs upon the (say) white males who are affected by them, but she argues that this 
is not necessarily unjust: 
 
…of course choosing this way [reverse discrimination] of making amends means that the costs are imposed 
on the young male applicants who are turned away. And so it should be noticed that it is not entirely 
inappropriate that those applicants should pay the costs. No doubt few, if any, have, themselves, 
individually, done any wrongs to blacks and women. But they have profited from the wrongs the 
community did. Many may actually have been direct beneficiaries of policies which excluded or 
downgraded blacks and women – perhaps in school admissions, perhaps elsewhere; and even those who did 
not directly benefit in this way had, at any rate, the advantage in the competition which comes of 
confidence in one’s full membership, and of one’s rights being recognized as a matter of course.
22 
 
The principle at stake seems to be that, by benefiting from an act of injustice, one can acquire 
obligations towards the victims of that injustice. This is not an uncontroversial conclusion, and it 
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has been strongly criticised by Robert Fullinwider. Fullinwider claims that the passage cited 
above reflects a particular moral principle, “he who benefits from a wrong must help pay for the 
wrong.”
23
 Fullinwider claims that this is “surely suspect as an acceptable moral principle”, 
suggesting that only “he who wrongs another shall pay for the wrong” is justifiable as a principle 
of compensatory justice.
24
 To illustrate his case he uses the following example: 
 
While I am away on vacation, my neighbour contracts with a construction company to repair his driveway. 
He instructs the workers to come to his address, where they will find a note describing the driveway to be 
repaired. An enemy of my neighbour, aware, somehow, of this arrangement, substitutes for my neighbour’s 
instructions a note describing my driveway. The construction crew, having been paid in advance, shows up 
on the appointed day while my neighbour is at work, finds the letter, and faithfully following the 
instructions paves my driveway.
25 
 
It is clear, that in this case the neighbour is a victim of his enemy’s unjust act, and has a valid 
claim against him. But what is to be done in the absence of the enemy? Fullinwider rejects the 
conclusion, which he believes follows from the principle of compensatory justice he attributes to 
Thomson, that I am obliged to pay my neighbour for his driveway, contending that to do so 
would constitute an act of moral supererogation; a laudable act certainly, but not one which is 
required by a moral obligation. The key point for Fullinwider is that the receipt of the benefit in 
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this case is involuntary. Perhaps the situation is different with regard to those who willingly 
accept benefits stemming from injustice: “If I knowingly and voluntarily benefit from wrongs 
done to others, though I do not commit the wrong myself, then perhaps it is true to say that I am 
less than innocent of these wrongs, and perhaps it is morally fitting that I bear some of the costs 
of compensation.”
26
 But those who involuntarily receive benefits bear no compensatory 
obligations. 
 
This takes us to the heart of the issue. Is Fullinwider right about the involuntary receipt of 
benefits? It seems to me that he is not, and that the power of his example derives from a 
confusion over how extensive compensatory obligations stemming from injustice should be.  
So let us return to the drive. The crucial question here seems to stem from my attitude towards 
my newly re-surfaced drive. Let us suppose that the drive cost my neighbour £500. I have not, 
however, benefited financially, as the re-surfacing has added no value to my property.
27
 But let us 
also assume that I have indeed derived overall benefit from the experience, in that I prefer my 
new drive to my old one. This is not to say, of course, that I would necessarily have been willing 
to pay £500 to have it re-surfaced. Let us suppose that, had the drive re-surfacer knocked on my 
door the day before and offered to re-surface my drive for £500, I would have refused.
28
 Asking 
me to pay £500 in this circumstance does seem unfair, since to do so would leave me worse off 
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than I would be had the whole experience not taken place. I would, in truth, have become the 
victim of the piece. But this is not the only alternative open to us. Imagine that the drive re-
surfacer had in fact offered to do my drive for £200. This is considerably below the going rate, 
and I may well have leapt at the opportunity. If this was indeed the case, and I am 
correspondingly (at least) £200 better off on the basis of my own evaluation, then is it 
unreasonable to say that I should pay £200 to my neighbour? After all, I am still benefiting from 
the whole transaction; to use economic terminology, I am on a higher utility curve than before. 
We may well think that I do not (necessarily) owe my neighbour £500, but it does not necessarily 
follow from this that I owe him nothing at all. Certainly I am innocent of wrongdoing towards 
him at this point. But might it not be that our moral relationship, the balance between the two of 
us, will be altered if I materially benefit from my neighbour’s unrectified experience of injustice 
without making any effort to offset his losses? 
 
Fullinwider’s example seems initially powerful due to its “all or nothing” character. However, 
one can have compensatory obligations to X without having an obligation to compensate X fully. 
Thomson’s point in relation to affirmative action, if it is to succeed, must be that the situation of 
white males even after policies of affirmative action have been put into place is better than it 
would have been had past and recent injustice not occurred; they derive a net benefit from their 
social position even when such policies have been enacted. Clearly, the principle “he who 
benefits from a wrong shall pay for the wrong”, which Fullinwider initially erroneously attributes 
to Thomson, is a nonsense, given that the benefit one receives from the wrong might be utterly 
marginal, whereas the cost of paying for it might be monumental. So the compensatory 
obligations of the beneficiaries of injustice can be limited to paying compensation up to the point 
where they are no longer beneficiaries of the injustice in question. Nor is it necessarily the case 
that a beneficiary need pay anything at all, given that other parties (most notably, the agent 
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responsible for the act in question) may have prior obligations which fully compensate the 
victims, leaving no work for the beneficiary to do.
29
 Insofar as the receipt of benefits does give 
rise to a principle, it can only be as demanding as, “she who benefits from a wrong may have 
obligations to (help to) pay for the wrong, insofar as doing so does not leave her worse off than 
had the wrong not occurred.” Interestingly, this follows closely a parallel argument within the 
literature on political obligation, over the extent to which the involuntary receipt of benefits 
provided by the state can ground obligations to obey the law. Jonathan Wolff, for example, 
disputes the extent to which this can be the case on the basis that, for some people, the benefits 
the state provides are not worth the price the state extracts: i.e. acceptance of political obligations. 
Thus he writes (of the fairness account of political obligation): 
 
                                                           
29
 Generally, it seems to me that we should see the obligations of offender to victim as conceptually prior to 
any compensatory obligations other parties might have. O’Neill argues that only when compensation is 
forthcoming from offender to victim can restitution, in the sense of the restoration of the moral relationship 
between the parties, occur. As such, compensation is always a second-best response to an incidence of 
injustice. Thus, there is a temptation to introduce lexical priority here, and hold that third parties only 
acquire compensatory obligations when offenders cannot or will not fulfil their own obligations. However, 
some may prefer to extend Miller’s “connection theory” into this area, and maintain that this is only a 
presumptive priority. It is quite possible to think of circumstances where relatively minor wrongs could 
have massive consequences, in that one party could lose and a third party could gain huge amounts, but 
where the offender makes no material gain at all, or even an overall loss (should, for example, her plans go 
awry). It is not necessarily clear that the offender should foot all of this bill, even if she is able to, when 
such an obvious distortion has entered into the distributive scheme. Nonetheless, even Fullinwider’s revised 
formula, “he who benefits from a wrong must help pay for a wrong” is far too strong here, as in many cases 
of wrongdoing when a third party benefits, the entire burden of compensation will fall on the wrongdoer. 
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…a revised account does not appeal to the idea that the mere receipt of benefits is sufficient to create 
obligations… Rather obligations are generated for an individual only if an individual receives a net benefit 
according to his or her subjective scale of valuation.
30 
 
It is my contention that compensatory obligations can be generated in a similar fashion. Moral 
agents can have obligations to compensate victims of injustice if they are benefiting and the 
victims are suffering from the automatic effects of the act of injustice in question. It is crucial to 
the argument that the losses and benefits in question arise from injustice, which is to say wrong-
doing by other agents. The individual’s duty not to benefit from another’s suffering when that 
suffering is a result of injustice stems from one’s moral condemnation of the unjust act itself. In 
consequence, a duty to disgorge (in compensation) the benefits one gains as a result of injustice 
follows from one’s duty not to so benefit. My claim is that taking our nature as moral agents 
seriously requires not only that we be willing not to commit acts of injustice ourselves, but that 
we hold a genuine aversion to injustice and its lasting effects. We make a conceptual error if we 
condemn a given action as unjust, but are not willing to reverse or mitigate its effects on the 
grounds that it has benefited us. The refusal undermines the condemnation. The belief that certain 
acts are wrong and should not be performed on account of their harmful consequences commits 
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one to endorse the application of corrective justice to seek to undo the effects of injustice, insofar 
as doing so does not render oneself a victim, by making one worse off overall. Being a moral 
agent means being committed to the idea that justice should prevail over injustice. Losses which 
others suffer as a result of the unjust actions of other persons cannot be dismissed as arbitrary or 
simply unfortunate: they create distortions within the scheme of fair distribution. If no one else is 





It is useful here to consider Janna Thompson’s work on the nature of apologies for historic 
wrongs. Thompson’s query is what it means to say that one is “sorry” that a particular event 
occurred. She identifies what she calls, “the apology paradox”: if we owe our existence to a given 
act of injustice, and if we are happy that we are alive, how can we meaningfully say that we 
regret the act of injustice that brought our very existence about? And if we do not regret the act of 
injustice, how can we apologise for it? Thompson argues that we need to reinterpret what we are 
actually doing when we apologise for historic injustice: 
 
Many people feel uncomfortable or even apologetic about benefiting from an injustice even when they had 
no responsibility for it. They are sorry that the good things they now possess came to them because of a 
past injustice. They do not regret that they have these things, but that they came to have them in the way 
they did. An apology could be interpreted as an expression of this kind of regret. So interpreted it is not, 
strictly speaking, an apology for the deeds of our ancestors or an expression of regret that they happened. 
Rather, it is an apology concerning deeds of the past, and the regret expressed is that we owe our existence  
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and other things we enjoy to the injustices of our ancestors. Our preference is for a possible world in which 
our existence did not depend on these deeds.
32 
 
The claim here is not that we should regret our own existence, insofar as it stems from historic 
injustice, but that we should regret the fact that our existence is a result of unjust rather than just 
actions. We would prefer a world where both we existed and where our ancestors had not acted 
unjustly. But if we accept (as I think we should) all that Thompson says, are we not obliged in 
fact to do rather more than simply regret the fact that the world is as it is, and issue an apology in 
recognition of this fact? If we actually wish that we were in a different kind of world, and think 
that such a world would be more just than our current world, surely it follows that we should seek 
to make our world more similar to the counterfactual world in question? Thompson specifically 
refers to “our existence and other things we enjoy”. But while we obviously cannot alter the fact 
that we have come into existence, we do have control over those “things we enjoy” which are 
transferable resources. Suppose that, through the intervention of an unknown enemy, the estate of 
A’s parents is left to B in their will rather than to A, as A’s parents had intended. A would surely 
be entitled to feel aggrieved if B expressed her sorrow at what had taken place, and expressed the 
wish that they lived in a counterfactual world where the event had never happened, while still 
retaining the estate. My point is not just that B’s expressed sentiments seem empty; it is that they 
are incompatible with her subsequent actions. If our moral condemnation of injustice, our regret 
that injustice has occurred, is to be taken seriously, it must be matched by action to remedy the 
effects of injustice, insofar as they persist as the automatic effects of injustice. We are right to feel 
guilty at benefiting from others’ misfortune, precisely because this suggests that we have not 
fulfilled our compensatory obligations. 
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One final point in this section. In his article “Superseding Historic Injustice”, Jeremy Waldron 
refers to what he calls the “contagion of injustice”. 
33
 The interdependence of different parties, 
both domestically and internationally, and their involvement in, for example, market transactions 
makes it likely that many people may, to an extent, have benefited as a result of a given act of 
injustice. It follows from the preceding argument that such people collectively possess a duty to 
put the situation right, insofar as doing so does not leave them worse off than if the injustice had 
not occurred. So it might well be argued, for example, that the West as a whole has benefited 
from the injustices of the colonial period, and so even those countries which did not directly act 
as colonial powers may have compensatory duties in the current day. When considered at a 
domestic level, the likelihood that many and diverse innocent third parties may have benefited 
from a given act of injustice may in some cases make the fulfillment of the ensuing collective 
duties at best onerous, and at times practically impossible. This might well be thought to provide 
an argument for an automatic, government-sponsored scheme for compensation for the victims of 
crime. But this notwithstanding, we might nonetheless think that some duties may appear more 
pressing to some beneficiaries of injustice than to others. This relates to the earlier claim that 
recognising one’s duties amounts to a condemnation of the previous act of injustice, and a kind of 
determination that injustice should not prevail. It seems to me that the parties who should feel this 
most strongly are those people who were intended to benefit from the act of injustice. Consider, 
yet again, the example of the driveway. Suppose that the purpose of the evil note leaver was not 
only to harm my neighbour, but also to benefit me specifically. Insofar as I have in fact benefited 
from his actions, he has achieved his aim and injustice, as it were, has triumphed. This is true not 
only in the sense that a distortion in the fair scheme of distribution remains, but also in the sense 
that what has resulted is the precise unfair distribution which the perpetrator of injustice intended. 
This has relevance in an intergenerational context, in that it is often a major aim of those who 
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seek to gain advantage to improve the prospects of their descendants, and relevance in an 
international context, as frequently the motivation for international wrongdoing is to benefit one’s 
nation, understood as a historic community which exists through time. There is, then, a sense in 
which it might not be wholly accurate to see some innocent persons or groups as genuinely third 
parties in relation to injustice. Their position is more involved or implicated than this. It is not a 
necessary condition of having these duties that it was intended that we benefit from the act of 
injustice, but it may be that we can see our moral duties more clearly when this is indeed the case. 
 
Part 3 – From theory to practice – problems of measuring benefit 
 
It has been claimed that insofar as moral agents have benefited from the wrongdoing of others, 
they may have obligations to compensate the victims of this wrongdoing. Undoubted 
complications arise, however, when we come to consider what it means to say that a given agent 
has indeed benefited from a given act of injustice. Thus far, the argument has concerned clear 
cases where one party suffers and another party benefits as an automatic result of an instance of 
injustice. As such, it is clearly dependent upon an understanding of what it means for a person or 
persons to so benefit, and for another to be disadvantaged. Such an assessment relies upon some 
kind of counterfactual calculation, whereby the actual world, following an act of injustice, is 
compared to an alternative, possible world where injustice is absent. The earlier example of the 
Polychrestos harvest is deliberately simplified in order to make calculations of the counterfactual 
seem uncomplicated: the relevant counterfactual is the world where D does not direct the 
underground river and B, C and D each harvest 200 kilos after 5 hours of work each day. The 
case is straightforward because the sole difference between the actual, unjust world and the just 
counterfactual world can be described as the automatic effect of the act of injustice. B has not 
done anything to deserve the extra 200 kilos she has gained, nor can it be maintained that C is at 
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fault in any way, or has worked less hard than she would have done had the act of injustice not 
occurred. So it seems relatively unproblematic to propose a transfer of 200 kilos from B to C. The 
driveway example is relevantly similar in this regard – all the difference between the actual world 
after the note switch and the counterfactual world where no injustice occurred can be attributed to 
the direct results of the dastardly actions of my neighbour’s enemy.  
 
The real world is rarely as straightforward as this. Arguments relating to benefiting from injustice 
often consider the lasting effects of historic actions, committed some considerable time in the 
past. Calculations of advantage and disadvantage stemming from historic injustice will, of 
necessity, have to refer to complicated counterfactuals. The question of how such counterfactual 
calculations should be made is undoubtedly a very important question within compensatory 
justice, and I consider it at length elsewhere.
34
  There are an infinite number of ways in which 
history might have unfolded had injustice not occurred, and so the challenge for the theorist is to 
identify the “morally relevant” counterfactual which can be used to assess gain and loss. The 
claim of this article is simply that, once the appropriate counterfactual has been identified, those 
who can be seen to have benefited as a result of injustice may bear compensatory duties to those 
who have been disadvantaged. This argument is quite distinct from the separate question of which 
counterfactual should apply in a given case, but it is worth suggesting that the most plausible 
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candidates will be those which allow an approximation of the automatic effects of injustice, 
which should be remedied, while still holding persons accountable for their actions and omissions 
following an act of injustice. So, for example, George Sher has argued that justice may not, in 
some cases, require individuals to be brought to the level of well-being they would have if 
injustice had not befallen them if we hold them to be at least partially responsible for their failure 
to recover from the effects of injustice. Sher uses the example of a student who is unjustly denied 
a place at law school. Had this not occurred, the student would have become a prominent lawyer 
with a high degree of prestige and a high salary. Instead, he allows himself to be discouraged by 
his rejection and does not reapply the next year, and so has a far inferior life. If we hold the 
candidate to be partially at fault for his situation for not reapplying, then we might suggest that at 
least part of his disadvantage relative to the injustice-free counterfactual is not a result of the 
“automatic effects” of the act of injustice, but rather because of his own omission. An extreme 
example will make the point: suppose that one day, when I am walking to the shops, I encounter 
my childhood nemesis, the boy who bullied me at school. Reverting to type, he trips me up and I 
fall over. As a result of this, I decide that the world is against me, and I elect to spend the rest of 
my days skulking in my house brooding upon my misfortune, instead of pursuing my successful 
and lucrative career as a popular circus performer. Now, in such a case I have been treated 
unjustly, but the vast majority of the responsibility for the difference between my actual and 
counterfactual positions seems to lie at my door. The suggestion is that I have allowed a trivial 
incident to blight my life; in short, I should have got over it. Thus the difference between actual 
and counterfactual world is down to my omissions, and the normative counterfactual - what I 
“should” have - is not the same as what I would actually have had if the unjust action in question 
had never occurred. If I neglect opportunities to acquire alternative entitlements, I cannot 
necessarily keep on blaming this on the original act of injustice. Sher goes on to link this claim to 
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a more general scepticism concerning compensatory obligations stemming from historic 
wrongdoing: 
 
Where the initial wrong was done many hundreds of years ago, almost all of the difference between the 
victim’s entitlements in the actual world and his entitlements in a rectified world can be expected to stem 
from the actions of various intervening agents in the two alternative worlds. Little or none of it will be the 
automatic effect of the initial wrong itself. Since compensation is warranted only for disparities in 
entitlements which are the automatic effect of the initial wrong act, this means that there will be little or 




The first point to make about this claim, as Simmons notes, is that it does not say that automatic 
effects of injustice necessarily cannot last over long periods of time, simply that it becomes 
harder to maintain that current disadvantage is the result of historic wrongdoing.
36
 Sher himself 
acknowledges this point when he suggests that ancient wrongs to Native Americans and African 
Americans within the US may be atypical in that they have made it very hard for the descendants 
of the originally injured parties to acquire alternative entitlements. Secondly, we should be 
careful when blaming the lingering effects of historic injustice on the omissions of the victims not 
to underestimate the profound impact which injustice can have upon its victims, even when they 
do make reasonable efforts to “get over” its effects. Of relevance here are Jeremy Waldron’s 
comments concerning the significance of historic wrongs to national and group identity.
37
 Insofar 
as injustice compromises the self-determination of a people, it can have a profound effect upon 
the national identity of members of the nation, and may indeed damage the ability of the nation to 
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govern itself subsequent to the act of injustice. In cases where the ability of nations to adapt and 
prosper has itself been affected by historic injustice, the extent to which they should be deemed 
responsible for their omissions must be accordingly limited. In any case, the point to be 
underlined for the sake of the present article is that it is the automatic effects of injustice, however 
calculated, with which we are primarily concerned. 
 
The identification of the morally relevant counterfactual is only half the problem, however, when 
it comes to making judgments as to advantage and disadvantage. Thus far, the calculation of what 
constitutes a benefit has been presented as either uncontroversial, as in the Polychrestos case, or 
as being subjective in that it depends upon the extent to which the putative beneficiaries believe 
that they have themselves benefited, as in the driveway case. That calculations of advantage will 
often turn upon the subjective preferences of those concerned does undoubtedly have 
complications for the application of the theory. It suggests that it would be very difficult to 
ground legal rights to compensation in a variety of such cases, as is demonstrated by existing 
laws on unjust enrichment. Seeking restitution in a legal context simply because another has been 
unjustly enriched at one’s expense is difficult in the absence of free acceptance of the benefit in 
question, because of the problem of subjective devaluation. This is an argument based upon the 
premiss, “that benefits in kind have value to a particular individual only so far as he chooses to 
give them value.  What matters is his choice.” So what constitutes a benefit is up to the individual 
and is an inherently subjective manner:
 
“Some people like their poodles permed. Others abhor 
permed poodles.”
38
 Only in the case where one party actually receives money can it be taken for 
granted that she has benefited, since its nature as a medium of exchange is taken to mean that is 
beneficial by definition: “Where the defendant received money, it will be impossible on all 
ordinary facts for him to argue that he was not enriched. For money is the very measure of 
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 To refer to the previous example; one could not hold the owner of the new 
driveway legally liable for the costs to his neighbour, because there is no way for an external 
agent to determine the degree of benefit the owner has received. There is nothing inherently 
unreasonable about his claiming that he has received no benefit from the experience whatsoever, 
and in fact preferred the drive as it was. Even if it is the case that the re-surfacing has 
unambiguously added to the value of his property, he still has to live with his unfavoured 
driveway until such a time as he sells his house, and it is quite conceivable that this experience 
might make him worse off overall, even if he eventually receives a higher price for his property. 
So it may be that, even if one accepts the moral force that attaches itself to benefiting from 
injustice, there is no way that rights stemming from such obligations can, in many cases, be 
written into the law, since defendants would simply have to claim that they did not consider 
themselves to have received benefit to avoid legal obligations. Two things follow from this. 
Firstly, and most obviously, the topic becomes more a matter of moral than legal obligation, 
unsuitable for codification into positive law. Benefiting from historical injustice may not present 
a sound way to ground claims against an unwilling putative beneficiary due to the problem of 
subjective devaluation. But there is no problem with claiming that moral agents must honestly ask 
themselves to what extent they have themselves benefited from injustice, and assess their moral 
obligations accordingly. This is not, of course, to say that the question is not a matter of public 
policy, but simply that it becomes a moral and a political question, of what ought to be done in 
policy terms, rather than of what one has to do in order to fulfill one’s legal obligations. When the 
beneficiaries are not individuals, with particular likes and dislikes, but collective entities such as 
peoples or corporations, it may in any case be easier to make an objective assessment of well-
being, and hence of advantage and disadvantage, by reference to material considerations. Such 
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Secondly, it might be that a discourse of “rights to compensation” on the parts of victims is 
simply misplaced in this context, and we should instead focus upon a duty based model, where 
initiatives of compensatory justice gain momentum not from the political protests of victims, but 
from critical reflection by benefiting moral agents as to the provenance of their advantages. Such 
an approach might address problems which Onora O’Neill has identified with rights-centred 
accounts of compensatory justice. She writes: 
 
When we ask what our rights are we no doubt assume that we and others are agents , but our first question 
is to ask what ought to be done for us, what we ought to receive from others. When we ask what our 
obligations are we begin by asking what we ought to do… [The rights-centred approach] invites a 
conception of oneself and others above all as victims, rather than as doers or citizens; it distracts allocation 
                                                           
40
 It should be noted here that the fact that the extent to which an individual benefits from a given action 
will, to a large extent, depend upon the subjective preferences of the agent does not necessarily mean that 
an individual cannot be mistaken concerning the degree of benefit which they have in fact received. 
Suppose it is the case both that a) I prefer, in aesthetic terms, my old driveway to my present driveway, and 
that b) the new driveway adds considerably to the value of my house. If I am not aware of (b), then it may 
be that I have in fact gained a net benefit from the act of injustice, but mistakenly believe that I have not. 
(Of course, it is still possible that even though I am ignorant of (b), my dislike of my new driveway is so 
great that I am not compensated by the increase in my property’s value, and so have not benefited overall.) 
In such a case, I do possess compensatory obligations to my neighbour, even though I am not aware of it. 
Whether or not I am culpable here, in moral terms, depends on whether we think I am negligent in failing 
to be aware of the true nature of the lasting effects of injustice. As noted above, I do believe that moral 
agents face a duty to scrutinise actively the nature and provenance of their place in the world. 
 30 
away from capacity for acting… Only the weak and powerless have reason to make the perspective of 




Insofar as those who have benefited from injustice are not the weak and powerless, this duty-
based model is surely the approach they should adopt. 
 
One final point arises. Throughout this article, I have sought to depict the involuntary 
beneficiaries of injustice as innocent third parties, even if their advantage was the motive of the 
wrongdoer. This is the correct way to address the problem in a purely theoretical sense. 
Throughout, the beneficiaries of injustice have been presented as if they have only just received 
the benefits in question. A and B, we might imagine, are considering C’s plight as they survey 
their freshly harvested Polychrestos crop.  The surprised owner of the repaired driveway has just 
come home from work and is trying to work out what to do next. In such cases, the beneficiaries 
in question truly are innocent third parties. But, if it is accepted that they at this point have 
rectificatory obligations to others, then they are innocent only insofar as they act reasonably 
promptly to fulfil the said obligations. A third party who benefits from injustice but does nothing 
to repair the plight of the victim, when it is clear that no other party is likely to act, is not an 
innocent bystander; she is acting unjustly in relation to the victim and so becomes a wrongdoer 
herself. Fullinwider states the principle succinctly in outlining the case against his own position: 
 
Possession of illicit benefits undermines one’s claim to “innocence”. The wrongful possession serves the 
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This argument is of great significance when it comes to considering real world compensation 
claims, precisely because they typically respond to acts of injustice which have already occurred, 
sometimes some distance in the past, and for which no one has paid compensation. In such cases, 
the argument is not simply that an innocent third party has moral obligations towards victims still 
feeling the effects of the act of injustice. It further holds that the third parties are themselves 
guilty of compounding the act of injustice by withholding due compensation, which is to say that 
they have acted unjustly to the victim and so may owe them compensation over and above that 
which would have been required had they acted correctly initially. This suggests an alternative 
vision of historical injustice; instead of seeing it as something which fades with time, perhaps we 
should see its continued non-rectification as a gigantic perpetuation of the injustice itself, locking 
successive generations into compensatory obligations which, in their turn, are not met.
43
 At the 
very least, it suggests an urgent need to consider the source of our present-day advantages – and 
to consider at what expense to others they were procured.
44
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